Foreign policy matters : a normative view of the G8 and population health. by Labonté,  Ronald & Schrecker,  Ted
185Bulletin of the World Health Organization | March 2007, 85 (3)
Abstract The Group of Eight (G8) countries occupy a dominant position in the international economic and political order. Given 
what is known about influences on the social determinants of health in an interconnected world, the G8 are a logical starting point 
for any enquiry into the relations between foreign policy and health.
We first make five arguments for adopting an explicitly normative, equity-oriented perspective on the performance of G8 policy 
in areas related to population health. We then examine G8 performance with respect to the crucial policy triad of development 
assistance, debt relief and trade, finding that neither rhetoric nor promising institutional innovation has been matched by resources 
commensurate with demonstrated levels of need.
We conclude that it is necessary to pursue advocacy efforts based on the normative perspective we have put forward and that 
doing so effectively requires further investigation of why some polities are more receptive than others to policies of redistribution 
both within and outside their borders.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2007;85:185-191.
Une traduction en français de ce résumé figure à la fin de l’article. Al final del artículo se facilita una traducción al español.
Foreign policy matters: a normative view of the G8 and 
population health
Ronald Labonte a & Ted Schrecker a
Introduction
The Group of Eight (G8) countries “ac-
count for 48% of the global economy 
and 49% of global trade, hold four of 
the United Nations’ five permanent Se-
curity Council seats, and boast majority 
shareholder control over the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.”1 The G8 provide roughly 75% of 
the world’s development assistance; their 
deep pockets, organizational resources 
and superior bargaining power provide 
them with formidable advantages in 
trade negotiations and dispute-resolu-
tion proceedings. The G8 “lacks the two 
main characteristics of more structured 
international governmental organiza-
tions … : a constitutive intergovern-
mental agreement, and a secretariat.” 2 
Nevertheless, the Group’s annual sum-
mits and periodic ministerial meetings 
have emerged as important forums for 
coordinating social and economic policy. 
Above and beyond policy and resource 
commitments, annual G8 summits “have 
value in establishing new principles in 
normative directions, in creating and 
highlighting issue areas and agenda 
items, and in altering the publicly al-
lowable discourse used.” 3
Social determinants of health, of 
which health care is only one, are af-
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fected by social and economic policy 
choices made outside the health sector, 
notably “those central engines in soci-
ety that generate and distribute power, 
wealth and risk.” 4 Globalization is a key 
influence on those processes, and major 
“asymmetries” of power and resources 
between rich and poor countries char-
acterize the institutions of globalization 
and the resulting distribution of gains, 
losses and policy autonomy.5 In an inter-
connected world, influences on the social 
determinants of health cannot be un-
derstood in isolation from those asym-
metries and the policy choices in which 
they originate.6–8 The G8’s economic 
and political power makes it a logical 
starting point for any such enquiry.
In this article, we articulate an 
explicitly normative perspective on how 
the policies of G8 countries affect popu-
lation health outside their borders. We 
then examine G8 policies in three areas 
— development assistance, debt relief 
and trade policy — that represent major 
channels of influence on the resources 
available in developing countries to 
meet basic health-related needs. Despite 
promising initiatives, G8 performance 
has been inadequate when viewed 
against demonstrated levels of need and 
against an emerging consensus in the 
relevant policy communities on how 
best to meet those needs. Those of us 
concerned with global health equity 
must intensify advocacy efforts directed 
at the G8. To be effective, we must also 
increase efforts to understand what ele-
ments of the domestic political context 
within G8 countries make some govern-
ment leaders, and some polities, more 
receptive to such efforts.
The G8 and global health: 
why care?
Mainstream perspectives on international 
relations are sceptical about applying 
ethical criteria to the actions of national 
governments, viewing expectations that 
they will be driven by considerations other 
than national self-interest as unrealistic. An 
alternative view is gaining prominence: 
“Global actors and institutions, whether 
they act bilaterally (especially direct 
overseas development assistance, trade 
agreements) or multilaterally (through, 
e.g., the United Nations system, World 
Bank or International Monetary Fund), 
are obligated to remedy global inequalities 
that exist in affluence, power, and social, 
economic and political opportunities”.9 As 
applied to the G8, at least five arguments 
for this view can be identified.
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First, the G8 themselves are com-
mitted to “make globalization work 
for all [their] citizens and especially the 
world’s poor.” 10 At a minimum, this 
means the G8 are committed to im-
proving the ability of the world’s poor, 
however defined, to meet basic health-
related needs.
Second, the international com-
munity, as represented by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, has committed support 
to achieving the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) by specified 
target dates, usually the year 2015. 
Three MDGs are explicitly health-related 
(http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/); 
others directly address crucial determi-
nants of (ill) health: extreme poverty, 
under nourishment, living in slums, 
subordination of women and lack of 
access to education, safe water and 
basic sanitation. The goals and targets 
are ambitious relative to the size of the 
challenge, yet modest in terms of, for 
instance, their aspirations for reducing 
absolute poverty and improving the lives 
of slum dwellers. In several regions of 
the world the MDGs will not be met in 
the absence of greatly intensified policy 
efforts on the part of the industrialized 
world.11–13 Both because of the need for 
such efforts and because choices made by 
governments in many developing coun-
tries have been constrained by global 
economic institutions and markets, it is 
prima facie reasonable to assign the G8 
a substantial share of responsibility for 
this failure.
Third, the disparity between the 
resources available to the world’s affluent 
minority and the modest cost of medi-
cal and public health interventions that 
would save millions of lives per year may 
be regarded as ethically reprehensible; this 
is because simple arithmetic suggests that 
it is so easily avoidable14 and because the 
basic needs of hundreds of millions of 
people remain unmet while the winners in 
the global economy enjoy unprecedented 
opportunities for luxury consumption.
Fourth, in an interconnected world 
it is reasonable to search for past and 
current causal responsibility (who makes 
what happen?) for such disparities in 
the patterns of interconnection. Phi-
losopher Thomas Pogge expands this 
argument with specific reference to the 
global persistence of poverty,15,16 which 
undoubtedly cuts off the opportunity to 
lead a healthy life.17 He argues that “our 
failure to make a serious effort towards 
poverty reduction may constitute not 
merely a lack of beneficence, but our ac-
tive impoverishing, starving, and killing 
millions of innocent people by economic 
means.” 15
Fifth, the two immediately preced-
ing arguments assume special signifi-
cance in the context of international hu-
man rights law. Key elements include the 
right to an adequate standard of living 
as outlined under Article 25 of the 1948 
Universal declaration of human rights; 
the right in Article 28 “to a social and 
international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion can be fully realized,” which some 
commentators read as creating clear 
cross-border obligations; and national 
obligations “to respect, protect and fulfil” 
the right to health set out in the 1966 
International covenant on economic, 
social and cultural rights.18 Although 
no effective supranational mechanisms 
now exist to ensure respect for these 
requirements, they cannot be dismissed 
as a source of obligations, and they are 
the focus of increased attention within 
the UN system.19
Rating the G8
Choices about official development 
assistance, debt relief and trade policy 
decisively influence both the volume of 
resources available to meet basic needs 
in much of the developing world and the 
domestic policy environment for meet-
ing those needs.6–8 This policy triad is 
therefore essential subject matter for rat-
ing the G8’s performance with respect 
to population health.
Many developing countries’ spend-
ing on health is only a fraction of 
the amount needed to provide basic 
health services; ironically, the poorest 
countries tend to be those where the 
proportion of out-of-pocket health-care 
expenditure is highest.20 Even with the 
most optimistic assumptions, many 
countries cannot remedy this situation 
without more, and more predictable, 
inflows of official development as-
sistance, sometimes for 20 years or 
longer.20 Estimates of the value of ad-
ditional official development assistance 
needed to meet the health MDGs range 
from US$ 25 billion to US$ 70 billion 
per year between (roughly) 2005 and 
2015; official development assistance 
for health as of 2004 was approximately 
US$ 12 billion.20,21 The Commission 
for Africa established by the United 
Kingdom in advance of the 2005 G8 
summit 22 and the UN Millennium 
Project 23 concluded that the industri-
alized world needs approximately to 
double its spending on official develop-
ment assistance as a necessary, although 
not sufficient, condition for achieving 
the entire suite of MDGs.
Development assistance
In 2005, the G8 countries promised a 
US$ 25 billion increase in annual official 
development assistance for Africa by 
2010 (thus doubling their present level 
of assistance), driven primarily by the 
pledge of the European Union to raise 
members’ aid spending to a long-stand-
ing UN target of 0.7% of gross national 
income. Canada, Japan and the United 
States offered increases in aid levels but 
did not commit to reaching the target, 
and all G8 countries currently lag be-
hind some non-G8 countries that have 
exceeded the 0.7% target consistently 
(Fig. 1). Official development assistance 
for 2005 included one-off debt cancella-
tions for strategically important and oil-
rich Iraq and Nigeria; however, without 
further new commitments, spending 
may actually decline in 2007 and may 
have done so in 2006 (data are not yet 
available).24 The Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the 
G8’s flagship global health programme 
when it was announced, remains drasti-
cally under funded and precariously 
reliant on short-term financing.25 Even 
if commitments for official develop-
ment assistance to Africa are fulfilled, 
questions remain about the future of 
health equity elsewhere in the develop-
ing world; more than 70% of the world’s 
most desperately poor people, as defined 
by the World Bank’s admittedly conten-
tious poverty line of US$ 1.00 per day, 26 
live outside Africa (there are 100 million 
more such people in south Asia alone 
than there are in Africa).27
To answer predictable criticisms, 
it must be emphasized that official de-
velopment assistance is not a panacea. 
Major improvements are needed in the 
quality of administration (in both donor 
and recipient countries) and the pur-
poses for which aid is used. According to 
the UN Millennium Project, just 14% of 
aid in low-income countries, and 27% in 
middle-income countries, directly sup-
ports meeting MDGs: 23 a useful if im-
perfect indicator of how much aid meets 
basic needs. That project and other large-
scale research syntheses have shifted the 
burden of proving the need for increased 
aid away from proponents;22 it now must 
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Fig. 1. Trends in providing development assistance for G8a countries and selected 
comparison countries, 1985–2005
a The Russian Federation is not a significant aid donor.
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Database on Aid from Development 
Assistance Committee Members (http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1); 2005 figures from OECD 
Development Assistance Committee.60
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be met by those who maintain fiscally 
convenient scepticism about the value 
of aid. Further, efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of aid must de-emphasize 
evaluating the recipient countries using 
buzzwords like “good governance” and 
“absorptive capacity” and instead focus 
on donors’ policies (tied aid, multiple 
and complex reporting requirements, 
short-term financial commitments, 
priorities unrelated to basic needs and 
public expenditure budget ceilings) that 
create inefficiencies in the deployment 
of aid and prevent it from being used 
appropriately in ways that contribute 
to health equity.
Debt relief
External debt has been recognized for 
almost 20 years as undermining the 
ability of developing countries to meet 
basic needs.28,29 It is perhaps the single 
most fundamental constraint on aid 
effectiveness: in every region of the 
developing world except sub-Saharan 
Africa, financial outflows to service 
external debt consistently exceed the in-
flow of development assistance (Fig. 2). 
The G8 took the lead in partially can-
celling the external debts of some of 
the world’s poorest countries through 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative, making possible increases in 
public spending on health and educa-
tion in several recipient countries.30 The 
initiative’s progress towards meeting ba-
sic needs and reducing debt burdens has 
nevertheless been inadequate.31 Many 
countries saw only modest decreases in 
their debt-service obligations, and three 
actually saw increases as of 2005.32 Like 
the promised increases in official devel-
opment assistance, the 2005 summit 
commitment to additional multilateral 
debt cancellation for 18 heavily indebted 
poor countries that have reached their 
“completion point” — the commit-
ment now known as the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative — was welcome 
and overdue.
However the 2005 and 2006 sum-
mits left crucial issues unresolved. The 
countries eligible for multilateral debt re-
lief are not the countries where a major-
ity of the world’s poor live; many other 
low- and middle-income countries will 
require substantial debt relief to achieve 
the MDGs.23,33 Debt “sustainability” for 
countries eligible for multilateral debt 
relief continues to be defined in a way 
that gives priority to repaying creditors. 
An alternative definition of sustainability 
works backward from estimates of the 
minimum public expenditure required 
to meet basic needs and only then 
determines how much (if any) of the 
public budget should be devoted to 
debt repayment; this approach implies 
a need for far more extensive debt can-
cellation.23,33,34 Under the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative, as under its pre-
decessor initiative, in order to have their 
debts cancelled countries must comply 
with macroeconomic conditionalities 
recommended by international financial 
institutions; this is arguably a reprise of 
earlier, highly destructive “structural ad-
justment” programmes. Conditions may 
include further import liberalization 35 
and controversial public expenditure 
ceilings that limit governments’ ability 
to deliver health services and educa-
tion.36,37 Finally, the question remains 
why “odious debts” incurred by highly 
repressive or corrupt governments with-
out the consent of their citizens should 
be regarded as collectable under inter-
national law.38 One study calculates that 
US$ 726 billion of the current debt of 13 
developing countries is odious, and 10 
countries should actually receive refunds 
of US$ 383 billion in past payments on 
such debts.39
Trade liberalization
Trade is the third element to be consid-
ered. Main actors in development policy 
who disagree about much else nonethe-
less agree that improving market access 
for exports from developing countries 
is crucial to stimulating the economic 
growth that can support poverty reduc-
tion and associated improvements in the 
social determinants of health. However, 
important disagreements persist about 
the viability of export-oriented growth 
strategies and about how equitably their 
benefits are distributed. The research 
literature and many governments in 
developing countries attach special im-
portance to eliminating the agricultural 
subsidies that lower world prices and 
limit export opportunities for develop-
ing countries,22,40 although the actual 
magnitude and distribution of benefits 
from agricultural trade liberalization 
Special theme – Health and foreign policy
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Fig. 2. Debt service and development assistance, by region, 2000–2003
Source: World Bank Data from Econstats (http://www.econstats.com/wb/V392.htm and  
http://www.econstats.com/wb/V546.htm).
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remain contentious.41 World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) negotiations begun 
at Doha in 2001 were promoted as a 
“development round” in which the con-
cerns of developing countries, including 
agricultural subsidies, would be given 
priority. The 2006 summit’s 16 July 
“call for a concerted effort to conclude 
the negotiations of the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda … and to fulfil the 
development objective of the Round” 
echoed similar exhortations from previ-
ous summits. On 24 July, negotiations 
reached an impasse over the issue of agri-
cultural subsidies. Initial reports blamed 
the resistance of the United States and 
some countries of the European Union; 
perhaps expectations for the Doha round 
were always too high42 but failure of G8 
leadership is nevertheless evident.
As a result, industrialized coun-
tries may now emphasize bilateral or 
regional negotiations where disparities 
in bargaining power and resources are 
even greater than in the WTO context. 
The G8 agreed in 2005 that develop-
ing countries must “decide, plan and 
sequence their economic policies to 
fit with their own development strate-
gies”,43 but negotiating strategies and 
policy positions taken by member coun-
tries often do not respect this imperative. 
Even if policy instruments to support 
domestic producers that industrialized 
countries routinely used on their path 
to wealth remain permissible under cur-
rent WTO rules,44 they are precluded by 
commitments in an expanding number 
of bilateral and regional agreements.45 
Illustrating the danger, a growing num-
ber of trade treaties with the United 
States contain clauses 46 that undermine 
hard-won flexibilities in interpreting the 
agreement on Trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (also known 
as TRIPS) in order to protect access to 
essential medicines.
Trade policy lends itself uneasily to 
incorporating such distributional con-
siderations. Stiglitz and Charlton have 
pointed out that the development round 
of trade negotiations requires mov-
ing from a “mercantilist” orientation, 
involving parties with highly unequal 
resources and asymmetrical bargaining 
power, towards “a collectively agreed 
global social welfare function. However, 
there has been almost no discussion, let 
alone agreement, on what that function 
should be”.47 Although this implies a 
major value shift, a clear commitment 
to resource transfers from rich countries 
to poor countries may also be a practical 
prerequisite for reviving WTO negotia-
tions after the July 2006 failure.48
Health equity: beyond 
realism?
On the one hand, the G8 have demon-
strated their effectiveness as an alterna-
tive to WHO and other multilateral 
organizations in addressing global health 
issues, through such initiatives as the 
Global Fund.49 On the other hand, 
neither rhetoric nor promising institu-
tional innovation has been matched by 
resources commensurate with demon-
strated levels of need. For some observ-
ers, this is not surprising and indeed it 
is utopian to expect different outcomes, 
yet unless a collective shrug is viewed as 
an adequate response to millions of eas-
ily preventable deaths per year 50 more 
must be demanded from the G8. The 
questions are what and how.
One answer would be to expand the 
G8 into a larger club modelled on the 
Group of 20 finance ministers (known 
as the G20), which includes such emerg-
ing economies as Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the 
Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa and Turkey. This would reflect 
their growing global importance as they 
are integrated into production networks 
and capital markets, and bring to the 
table countries that account for 60% of 
the world’s population rather than the 
14% accounted for by the members of 
the G8.51 Yet the self-description of the 
G20 (on their web site) as comprising 
“systemically significant” economies 
raises the question of how systemically 
insignificant countries — including the 
entire African continent, except South 
Africa, and Nordic countries that con-
sistently lead the industrialized world in 
their commitment to official develop-
ment assistance (Fig. 2) — would be 
represented. The paradox here is that 
an apparently more inclusive structure 
actually implies deeper division between 
the included and the excluded.
A second approach, exemplified 
by health equity agendas,52 focuses on 
policy content. In our North American 
experience, understanding how social 
determinants of health are affected by 
policy choices outside the health sector 
and half a world away is highly limited 
even among otherwise sophisticated 
decision-makers and researchers. In 
Europe, recognition of the need to 
consider the health impacts of such 
policies is more advanced, as reflected in 
the Finnish presidency of the European 
Union, which took the theme of “health 
in all policies”. Nevertheless, the key 
background document for this initia-
tive 53 confined its analysis to impacts 
within countries of the European Union. 
Therefore, the consequences of G8 
policies for health outside the industrial-
ized world represent a theme of special 
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Résumé
Politique étrangère : point de vue normatif pour l’évaluation des résultats des interventions du G8 sur la 
santé publique 
Les pays du G8 occupent une position dominante sur la scène 
économique et politique. Au vu de ce que l’on sait de son influence 
sur les déterminants sociaux de la santé dans un monde, le G8 peut 
être considéré comme le point de départ logique de tout défaut 
d’équité dans les relations entre politique étrangère et santé.
Nous avons formulé cinq arguments en faveur de l’adoption 
d’un point de vue explicitement normatif et axé sur l’équité 
pour évaluer les résultats du G8 dans les domaines liés à la 
santé publique. Nous avons ensuite examiné ces résultats sous 
l’angle des trois composantes politiques clés suivantes : aide au 
développement, allègement de la dette et commerce, et nous 
avons constaté qu’aucune innovation prometteuse, ni sur le plan 
théorique, ni sur le plan institutionnel, n’avait été obtenue par des 
ressources en rapport avec l’ampleur des besoins démontrés.
En conclusion, il faut poursuivre les efforts pour promouvoir 
le point de vue normatif proposé et pour que cette promotion soit 
efficace, il faut étudier plus avant les raisons amenant certaines 
politiques étrangères à être plus réceptives que d’autres aux 
politiques de redistribution à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur de leurs 
frontières.
importance for analysis and advocacy, 
especially in situations where, as it now 
appears will be the case for the 2007 G8 
summit, health per se is not prominent 
on the agenda.
Policies in areas such as trade, debt 
relief and official development assistance 
unavoidably interact and must not op-
erate at cross purposes; yet, although 
policy coherence is important,54 a more 
fundamental issue involves the values 
around which policy coheres. A high 
degree of policy coherence already ex-
ists among, for example, the economic 
interests of producers in industrialized 
countries and the promotion of import 
liberalization by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the 
WTO. The effects may be destructive 
in terms of the determinants of health. 
Conversely, Norway’s 2006 declaration 
on international policy embodies quite 
a different set of values, committing 
Norway to, for example, oppose devel-
opment conditionalities that promote 
privatization and to support only trade 
policies that will not prevent poorer 
countries from developing into “welfare 
societies” like Norway’s.55
Can and will the richest and most 
powerful countries similarly promote 
what Michael Marmot, chair of WHO’s 
Commission on Social Determinants 
of Health, calls “a vision of the world 
where people matter and social justice 
is paramount”? 56 Because the G8 are 
formal democracies, this question must 
ultimately be asked not of leaders but of 
their electorates. Levels of official devel-
opment assistance are highly imperfect 
proxies for an equity-oriented approach 
to foreign policy, but the persistent 
fourfold difference among industrialized 
countries in aid commitments (Fig. 1) is 
clearly relevant. As predicted by research 
describing the relation between national 
policies on domestic welfare and levels 
of development assistance,57 an inverse 
correlation exists across many countries 
between the percentage of gross national 
income allocated to development assis-
tance and internationally standardized 
child poverty rates.58 It is important, 
then, not only to demonstrate clearly the 
links between foreign policy and health 
in countries half a world away, but also 
to ask why some industrialized countries 
appear markedly more receptive than 
others to the redistribution of resources 
both within and across their borders. 
The answers are crucial to advocating 
more effectively for global health equity. 
Invoking differences in political culture 
substitutes description for explanation;59 
advocates for health equity must ask 
where political culture comes from and 
how it can be changed.  O
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Los países del Grupo de los Ocho (G8) ocupan una posición 
dominante en el orden económico y político internacional. 
Considerando lo que hoy sabemos sobre las influencias en los 
determinantes sociales de la salud en un mundo interconectado, 
el G8 es un punto de partida lógico para cualquier investigación 
sobre las relaciones entre política exterior y salud.
En primer lugar aportamos cinco argumentos para adoptar 
una perspectiva explícitamente normativa y orientada a la 
equidad sobre el funcionamiento de las políticas del G8 en 
ámbitos relacionados con la salud de la población. A continuación 
examinamos el desempeño del G8 respecto de una tríada crucial 
Resumen
La política exterior importa: una perspectiva normativa del G8 y la salud de la población
en materia de políticas: la asistencia para el desarrollo, el alivio 
de la carga de la deuda y el comercio, y hallamos que ni las 
declaraciones ni las prometedoras innovaciones institucionales se 
han visto igualadas por unos recursos proporcionales a los niveles 
de necesidad observados.
Nuestra conclusión es que es necesario emprender actividades 
de promoción basadas en la perspectiva normativa que hemos 
propuesto, y que para actuar eficazmente en ese sentido es preciso 
seguir investigando por qué algunos sistemas de gobierno son más 
sensibles que otros a las políticas de redistribución tanto dentro 
como fuera de su territorio.
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صخلم
ناكسلا ةحصلو ةينماثلا نادلبلا ةعومجلم ةيرايعم ةرظن :ةماه ةيجراخلا ةسايسلاا
 .يلماعلا سيايسلاو يداصتقلاا ماظنلا في ًاماه ًاعقوم ةينماثلا نادلبلا ةعومجم لغشت
 طباترم لماع في ةحصلل ةيعماتجلاا تاد ِّدحلما تايرثأت نع فورعم وه الم ًارظنو
 نع راسفتسا يلأ ةيقطنم ةيادب دعت ىبركلا ةينماثلا نادلبلا ةعومجم نإف ،ءاجرلأا
 .ةحصلاو ةيجراخلا ةسايسلا ينب ةقلاعلا
 تاذو ،حضاو لكشب ةيرايعم رظن تاهجو يِّنبتل تاقلطنم ةسمخب انأدب دقو
 ةينماثلا نادلبلا ةعومجم تاسايس في ءادلأا لوانتتو ةاواسلماو ةلادعلا وحن ه ُّجوت
 في  ةينماثلا نادلبلا ةعومجم ءادأ انسرد مث .ناكسلا ةحصب قلعتت عيضاوم في
 .ةراجتلاو نويدلا نم ءافعلإاو ةيومنتلا تادعاسلما يهو ةيسيئرلا ةيسايسلا ةيثلاثلا
 لم اهلعف ىجري يتلا ةيسسؤلما تاردابلماو ةلجترلما تاردابلما نم ًلاك نأ اندجو دقو
.ةجاحلا نم ةتبثم تايوتسم نمض اهيلع قفتا يتلا دراولما اهل صصخت
 رظنلا تاهجو لىع ةدنتسلما ةيعوتلا دوهج ةعباتم يروضرلا نم نأ انجتنتساو 
 لوح تاساردلا نم ديزلما ضيتقي كلذ قيقحت نأو ،ًاقباس اهانعضو يتلا ةيرايعلما
 جراخ مأ اهنادلب دودح نمض ًءاوس اهيرغ نم ثركأ تاسايسلا ضعب لوبق ببس
.دودحلا كلت
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